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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Question and organization of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to show that historical precedents still govern the 
relationships between Republic of Poland and Russian Federation. It is further suggested that 
a number of historical factors – to be specified below – contribute to animosity between 
Poles and Russians, on both – governmental and societal levels, and that the Russian 
Federation asserts superiority in the relationship. 
The relationship between two states has been very cool after 1989 and the interactions 
are marked with many tensions and even crises. The nature of their current affairs seems to 
have its roots in the past, as well as in the present configuration of international relations. 
This seems to be especially true of the clash between Russian and Polish governments’ views 
on particular international issues (current examples include April’s 2007 crisis in Estonia, 
“Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, and anti-missile shields project). The first factor, which is 
the past, leads to the second factor, which is the current relationship between the two 
countries. 
First, this work will present a summary of their common past, starting with the years 
when Poland was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, which are 1947-1989. This would be a 
summary of the ‘brotherhood” between the two nations, which illustrates the great disparity 
between actions of the Polish government and expectations of the civic society. History prior 
to the 1989 (decisive events that had taken place since 966) will be shown to be one of the 
most crucial factors that shape today’s interactions between Poland and Russia. The 
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remainders of this thesis will focus on the almost twenty years period that has occurred after 
Poland’s transition from communism to democracy, the years from 1989 to 2007. Covered 
will be the main disputes and agreements, failures and successes, which will allow us to form 
some conclusions about the nature of the relations between the two. Also, this summary will 
present how this relationship affects the societies of both countries, and Polish affairs with 
other post-communist states, as well as with the European Union.  
This thesis will also provide data on current public opinion in both countries. This is 
to show how subjective opinions of the public differ (or not) from the official relations that 
are taking place between the Russian and Polish governments.  
Imperialism theory will play important role, as a framework for the observations. 
With Russia looking down at many post-communist states, it can be argued that its actions 
resemble the politics of many former colonizers. Some links may be found between the 
colonizers’/imperialistic model of the world and Russia’s model of post-communist world. 
Russia’s imperialistic ambitions, known very well from world’s history, may find their 
reflection in its modern foreign policy toward Poland.  
This work will finally present some of the options for future relations between the 
Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation. This will be done by looking at how those 
relationships have changed over time – whether they have improved or worsened.  The 
extensive discussion of the factors that may have an influence on the nature of those relations 
may be very helpful in predicting whether or not a change could occur.  
The remainder of this first chapter contains two elements: first, it is important to 
define the most essential terms used throughout the thesis.  Second, a discussion of the 
theoretical approach will follow. 
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Chapter two will discuss the historical background of the relationship between the 
two countries. The history of Poland and Russia and their relations will give a broader picture 
of a very complex and troubled history that contributed or even helped create the difficult 
current situation. The history between those two states will be divided into two separate 
sections with the first period lasting from 966 until WWII, the second from 1945 to 1989, 
which includes 1989, an important date for Poland. The common history of the two nations is 
very long and complex, but it is it is the main factor explaining the current situation. 
Chapter III will discuss the modern relations of both nations from 1989 to present. It 
will include the joining process as well as membership of Poland in the European Union and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The chapter will conclude with a series of 
current episodes between the two countries and their influence on the relationship. Those will 
include Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, the Estonian crisis of communist symbolism, the 
Russian embargo on Polish meat, USA’s plans for building a Missile Defense System in 
Poland and Czech Republic, and finally Russian energy politics towards Poland and the other 
European states. Chapter IV analyzes the relationship and will make some suggestions for the 
future of those relations and whether there might be any chance to change the current 
situation. 
 
Definitions of terms and features 
 
 Before describing the theoretical background there are several terms that need to be 
defined. The first term to be discussed is relations. It will be broadly used through out this 
thesis and, according to Merriam-Webster dictionary (2007) means “an aspect or quality (as 
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resemblance) that connects two or more things or parts as being or belonging or working 
together.” The relations between Poland and Russia, given their borders and proximity, are 
inescapable, and in simple words they can be bad, good or indifferent. The geographic and 
geopolitical placement of these two countries has doomed them to maintaining constant 
relations among each other. The governments and even the system can change, but the 
geographical placement of both states will not change, therefore it should be crucial for both 
sides to maintain normal relations. 
 The next important term to understand is a satellite state. The idea of “satellitization” 
pattern of Soviet neighbors was initiated by Joseph Stalin. “He sought, first, to eliminate all 
Western influence from Eastern Europe and, concomitantly, to establish Soviet hegemony” 
(Rubinstein 208). Alvin Rubinstein quotes Hugh Seton-Watson, whose work “The East 
European Revolution” gives three different steps of “satellitization”. These are “the genuine 
coalition, the bogus coalition, and the Communist controlled monolith.” Poland was one of 
the countries that had to go through painful sovietization as will be shown later in the thesis. 
 “Colonialism” is another term which will be more thoroughly discussed later and 
compacted definition is to follow. “Colonialism can be defined as the conquest and control of 
other people’s land and goods” (Loomba 7). Nevertheless, colonialism is also a cultural or 
ideological expansion of one country into another (Merriam-Webster). Many times the terms 
colonialism and imperialism are interchanged. “Imperialism” means “command or superior 
power” (Loomba 10). For the purpose of this thesis both terms will be used interchangeably. 
 Finally, the discussion will often include the term of “foreign policy”. According to 
Merriam-Webster dictionary (2007) it is “a policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with 
other sovereign states.” All those terms will be used throughout the thesis and will help in 
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explaining the complex nature of the Polish-Russian relations. Foreign policy is often 
presented by diplomacy, which is “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between 
nations” (Merriam-Webster). 
 
Theoretical Background – Imperialism theory  
 
 Imperialism as a term describes “the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the 
power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining 
indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas” (Merriam-Webster). The 
expression itself might be relatively young to the history of empire building. One of the 
major writers that dealt with imperialism was John A. Hobson. He “stressed the economic 
aspects of imperialism, but he also recognized that the three P’s – Pride, Pugnacity, and 
Prestige – were motivating forces of the movement” in the 19th Century (Kohn 5). Johan 
Galtung, in 1971, stated that in “two-nation world, imperialism can be defined as one way in 
which the Center has the power over the Periphery nation, so as to bring about a condition of 
disharmony of interest between them” (Galtung 83). Ania Loomba, in 2005, discussed 
imperialism as a direct connection with royalty. She argues that “while royalty were both 
financially and symbolically invested in early European colonisations, these ventures were in 
every case also the result of wider class and social interest” (Loomba 10).   
Karl Marx did not write directly about imperialism but wrote broadly about 
colonialism, especially the cases of Great Britain and India. He acknowledged the fact that 
capitalism was the most brutal form of the system; however he was aware of the fact that it 
was the next step towards socialism. He stated: “Along with the constantly diminishing 
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number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process 
of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; 
but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class” (Marx 836). Therefore, the advancing 
capitalism and capitalist imperialism is destructive in its nature, but on the other hand, it is 
crucial for achieving the higher goal of socialism in the future. 
 However, imperialism was also a concept widely mentioned by Vladimir Lenin. He 
often talked about financial or capitalist imperialism, which – what he claimed, was a 
different concept from political imperialism. The Soviet leader challenged the Karl Kautusky 
approach towards the concept that stated: “imperialism is a product of highly developed 
industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring 
under its control or to annex all large areas of agrarian territory, irrespective of what nations 
inhabit it” (Lenin 91). Lenin claimed that “the characteristic feature of imperialism is 
precisely that it strives to annex not only agrarian territories, but even most highly 
industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine)” (Lenin 
91). Lenin insisted on the importance of political imperialism and its “striving towards 
violence and reaction.” Moreover, he proposed the idea of monopoly capitalism which is also 
called imperialism, and which is a result of capitalism itself, because the market is too small 
for the capital product, therefore it is a must to find new markets and resources.    
 Ariel Cohen wrote in 1996 that Soviet Union “was indeed an empire, with one ethnic 
group (the Russians) dominating the others, simultaneously drawing on non-Russian elites as 
reservoir of imperial servants” (Cohen 151). Even though the term “imperialism” was hardly 
used after the collapse of Romanov Empire, the nature of that strategy remained. Cohen 
explains that “even in Western political science literature, the term “imperialist” had become 
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a pejorative one reserved almost exclusively for the overseas empires of England, France, 
and other traditional European colonial powers, and for the trade and investment domination 
of the United States” (Cohen 151).  
 Lenin was against imperialist quests but the actions of next subsequent Soviet leaders 
differed and showed an opposite view. Additionally, Cohen clearly stated that “Lenin’s anti-
imperialist tirades could have been easily applied by the Turkmestanis or Ukrainians to their 
sorry fate.” And on top of that, “in Russian colonies, as in their Western counterparts, 
brilliant careers were made, environments ruined, locals divided and exploited, and imperial 
power strengthened “(Cohen 152). 
 Imperialism or colonialism theory has been applied mostly to Western countries. 
However, a number of Russians helped develop these theories. Despite its turbulent history 
and constantly changing foreign policy, it seemed Russia always had to prove its power. The 
ways of doing so may have changed over time – from assaulting and acquiring the territory 
or resources by force to imposing political thought or particular ideas – but the urge for 
dominance remained. At the end of this thesis, it will become clearer that Russia has always 
had ambitions of becoming a great power at others’ cost, similarly to other colonial powers. 
Therefore, imperialism theory could be equally applied in the East – to the Soviet Union as 
well as the Russian Federation today. This will be done subsequently, starting with the next 
chapter which focuses on pivotal events from the history of Poland and Russia.  
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CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Major events until WWII 
 
    Poland and Russia have long complex history dating from 966, and often, it was 
very turbulent and violent. Many times there were more factors that divided the two countries 
than united them. It is important to mention that both nations have their roots in Christianity, 
which gave them similar character. Also, both were Christianized relatively early and around 
the same time. However, there is a main difference in the way the process took place. 
Poland’s Christianization took place in 966 through Bohemia. Russia, on the other hand, 
Christianized in 988 through Byzantium. This difference turned out to have an influence on 
the future Polish-Russian relations. It created two separate views of religion, which at that 
time played an important role, and in turn led to separate political worldviews. 
 Poland, through Western means of Christianization became a part of what would be 
“no longer what was named the Western Roman Empire nor even what we call the Franco-
Roman Empire become Roman German Empire or, more simply, Holly Roman Empire, but 
the unitary and resolvent Christendom of the entire Christian West” (Sturzo 68). Rome 
became the center of religious and cultural life in Europe. However, Russia stayed on the 
periphery of the “Christendom of the entire Christian West”. As a matter of fact, the East was 
following other rules, and separating itself from the West in order to create its own 
uniqueness and importance. This became Orthodox Christianity. 
 In Western part, which includes Poland, the Church enjoyed independence from the 
political rules. On the other hand, it also was the main stimulus for development of cultural 
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and social life. Waclaw Lednicki wrote: “not only was the Catholic Church organizing the 
cultural life of the nation through preaching, confessions, theological literature, schools, and 
numerous religious orders which brought to Poland material civilization but, what was more 
important, the Church shared with the political powers the task of consolidating the national 
life” (4). The role of the church in Russia was different and highly associated with 
Byzantium, where “the church was subjugated to the political power” and ”subjugated 
entirely to the political power, the church supported that power and thus assured its own 
moral prestige” (Lednicki 8). There was also different a approach towards the character of 
preaching and educating people. Catholicism put the pressure on didactic aspects of religion. 
This was done by creating schools, monasteries that would expand academic involvement in 
daily lives. On the other hand Orthodox Church “was not didactic in the western sense of the 
word, it did not teach by books, sermons and precepts but by examples” (Lednicki 8). 
 The idea of political ruling was also different in both nations. Lednicki wrote about 
the significant distinction for achieving political goals and gaining political power. He 
noticed lack of a “bloody struggle for political power” in Polish case. As a matter of fact, 
history shows very little or no cases where there was a literal fight for power. In the case of 
Russia, the reality was very different and “murders and violent dethronements of the tsars, 
and emperors became a sort of tradition” (Lednicki 5). This could be one of the reasons for 
creating in later generation of Russian tsars an imperialistic approach. However, for 
explaining the Polish question and specific placement of Poland in Russian political and 
military strategy, we have to look at the concept of Polish messianic role in the World. 
 “Poland is a historic nation with an indigenous national elite and a powerful sense of 
distinctiveness and identity” (Prizel 38). This is a short “definition” of Polish nation-state. 
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Throughout the long history of integration and constant fights and rivalry with the neighbors 
which included securing the border of Western Christendom against Islam, Poland and its 
citizens developed a unique feeling of responsibility for protecting Western culture and 
value. This created the concept of Messianism, widely used in Polish literature during 
Romantism period of XIX century. Interestingly, against this Polish Messianism there was 
distinct, but quite similar in character Russian messianic ideology. Its culture, based on the 
Byzantine values, was centered around the “only protector” of the Orthodox way of life. 
Lednicki wrote that Russian Tsars and Emperors considered their power as an absolute and 
given by God. Therefore, “as the ultimate result of these events Moscow represented a type 
of an Oriental despotism with a tendency towards state control characteristic of these 
organizations(…)and the equally characteristic tendency towards imperialism based on 
Byzantine religious and historical premises” (Lednicki 10). It could be expected that sooner 
or later those two different messianic concepts would clash. 
 The conflict began because of the territories of Ruthenia and Kiev, which before XIV 
century were occupied by Kievan Rus, and later were under influence of Tatars. In XIV 
century the territory was in possession of Grand Duke of Lithuania. Russian princes never 
gave this territory up; therefore they claimed their right to it. Poland and Lithuania had the 
same enemy, therefore after series of pacts and union both nations created a personal union 
followed by Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth in 1569. On the other hand, Muscovite Russian 
was under control of Mongol-Tatars. However, in 1380 Ivan the Great ended the control and 
started the idea of getting the territories taken by Tatars back. Ivan IV, who was the first 
Tsar, led many wars against Poland. Unsuccessful attempts to regain the power in claimed 
territories as well as desire of getting access to the Baltic Sea must have caused additional 
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resentment at Poland. Lednicki wrote: “At that moment Moscow under Ivan IV could have 
been completely subjugated to Poland”. However, “defense came from Rome, which still 
was dreaming about the union of churches and the Catholicization of Moscow” (14). With 
the time passing by “most Russians saw the Poles as the spearhead of western aggression, as 
renegades to Slavdom and the true faith” (Kohn 280). The messianic visions of both nations 
clashed, therefore negative vision of Poles among Russian and Russians among Poles could 
be understandable. 
 During the “time of troubles” in Muscovin Russia, parts of Polish-Lithuanian szlachta 
(nobel class in Poland and Lithuania) had a plan to use this situation and gain an influence 
over troubled Russia. With the help of false Dmitri and against the will of Polish king 
Zygmunt III Waza, parts of magnate groups and forces entered Muscovin territory in 1604 
(Evtuhov 148). It is important to mention, that this was a private intervention because the 
szlachta paid for the forces by themselves. The attack resulted in deaths of half of the group. 
But it made King Zygmunt III Waza declare official war. Despite occupying the Kremlin and 
aninitial agreement on putting King’s son on the Russian throne, the crisis occurred, because 
the Polish King wanted to take over the throne himself. Sweden, who was initially on 
Muscovy’s site also turned against it, placing Russia in very critical political situation. 
German and Polish occupation of the Kremlin finally ended, because of a successful Russian 
uprising in 1612. The time of troubles ended with the new tsar Michael Romanov of the new 
Romanov dynasty, with long-term aversion towards Poland.  
 The XVIII century was another complicated time for Polish foreign policy as well as 
independence because Russia was strongly pushing for gradual control over the 
Commonwealth. The way to keep Poland in check could be seen in 1768, when the Sejm that 
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was under heavy influence of Russian presence voted on the bill stating: “Russia now 
guaranteed the constitution and the real ruler in Poland was the Russian ambassador” 
(Hunczak 159). As a result of this Sejm session, Poles tried to fight the occupying army; 
however lack of organization resulted in a definite defeat. As a result, Russia started 
negotiation with Prussia and Austria in order to partition Poland 
 In 1774 it forced its candidate on Polish throne in the person of Augustus III. In spite 
of the Polish support of Stanislaw Leszczynski, the Russian candidate was placed by force. 
Peter III and Catherine the Great had a clear vision of Russian policy towards others. In short 
it could be characterized by aiming of “winning eastern Prussia and establishing Russia 
firmly as equal to Austria and France, with Saxony as its vassal and Poland under its control” 
(Baranovsky 25). 
 Russia wanted to control Poland and it was a very important element of its foreign 
policy. The signs of their imperialism were not limited to acquiring the territory but trying to 
influence internal politics, too.  Nikita Ivanovich Panin, who was a head of foreign policy 
under Catherine II, stated that “we shall lose a third of our power and advantages if Poland is 
not dependent on us” (Chechulin 208). Russia did not want Poland to regain a status of a 
powerful nation that existed in XV and XVI Century; therefore keeping Polish magnates 
under Russian influence was the key. Keeping Polish politics in a very chaotic and a 
deteriorating state was also another aspect of policy towards Poland in XVIII century. 
 The first partition of Poland took place in 1772 and Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth lost around one third of its territory. The reaction of other nations was not 
satisfactory for Poles because “in England and France opinion prevailed that the Poles 
themselves were responsible for their misfortune” (Hunczak 160). It was Austria and Prussia 
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that initiated the partition of Poland, and not Catherine II herself. Austria and Prussia made 
the move because “Russia’s military and naval successes now appeared as a greater threat 
than ever to Europe’s major powers” (Evtuhov 278). 
Twenty years later in 1791, Poland had a new and progressive constitution, but 
Catherine II did not support this move claiming it was breaching “their agreements with 
Russia”, therefore she negotiated again with Prussia and Austria and partitioned the 
Commonwealth two more times in 1793 and 1795 wiping Poland off the map. Three 
partitioning powers “vowed not to use the word Poland again. They were convinced that an 
independent Poland was incapable of establishing a stable government and declared that 
partition was necessary for preserving the peace and happiness of their citizens” (Evtuhov 
280).  
 Alexander I seemed to be friendlier than his predecessors towards the partitioned 
nation. Poles were trapped in difficult situation. They had no country and had to look up for 
help and mercy to other great powers. The first one to create optimistic illusions for Poland 
was Napoleon Bonaparte. He created the Duchy of Warsaw out of the Prussian partition. 
However, his “attitude to his Polish supporters was cynical at best” because he “resisted 
making a firm commitment to help the Poles in their struggle for independence” (Taras 23). 
The duchy stopped its existence in 1813 and Alexander I used his influence at the Congress 
of Vienna to bring Congress Kingdom of Poland to life. It was created out of the Duchy of 
Warsaw territories given to Russia. Alexander I crowned himself a king of Poland and took 
over Sejm sessions. The next two tsars, namely Nicholas I and Alexander II, did not have any 
intention of giving independence back to Polish people, who in turn revolted in 1830 and in 
1863. This resulted in liquidation of Congress Poland that was “reduced to a Russian 
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province administered by Russians” (Hunczak 166). To prevent further revolts Russians went 
further and “the reign of terror instigated by Russian officials was designed to eradicate 
Polish nationalism once and for all, but the atrocities were so massive and the Russification 
drive so brutal that world opinion was horrified” (Taras 25). It is worth mentioning here, that 
in the Prussian part of Poland there was already advanced Germanization of Poles living in 
there. The messianic mission that was mentioned before intensified even more under foreign 
occupation (the literature of Romantism of XIX Century is the reflection of the Polish 
situation) and “many now believed that Poland, like Christ, was destined to suffer in order to 
redeem the sins of other nations so that they, too, could become worthy of liberty” (Taras 
25).  
 The XX century, brought both positive changes and more tragic events. The World 
War I paradoxically, was an event with relative good consequences for Poland. The external 
situation was favorable for Poland – its politics and society. Russia withdrew from war, and a 
weakened Germany had to acknowledge Polish independence. Additionally, US President 
Woodrow Wilson called for an independent Poland in his thirteenth point of peace 
declaration in 1918. Nevertheless, the Polish rebirth has been limited to two things. First of 
all, Polish people “were far from being the sole architects of their reborn state” (Biskupski 
60). Western and Southern borders were drawn by parties that met in 1919 in Paris. The 
second crucial issue was the creation of the Eastern border, which resulted in a Polish-
Bolshevik armed conflict. Poland, with a rebirth of nationalism wanted to push the Soviets 
further away and regain old territories. Therefore in April of 1920 Jozef Pilsudski initiated a 
military campaign against the Bolsheviks. Poland managed to repulse the Russians who were 
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about to enter Warsaw. The conflict ended by bringing the borders back to the state of the 
second partition.  
 Despite the opportunities created by the World War I turmoil, the post-war period 
was difficult for Polish-Russian relations. “The 123-year period of foreign domination and 
the battle for independence had created a burden of expectations which would have been very 
difficult to fulfill. The post-war depression and the Great Depression of the early 1930s made 
it even more difficult for Poland to obtain foreign aid” (Prazmowska 168). It was clear for 
the new government of Poland, that it needed alliances because of rising powers of the Soviet 
Union in the east and Germany in the west. Geopolitical location comes in to political play 
again. Therefore, in the year of 1932, Poland signed with Russia a pact of nonaggression and 
after two years, this agreement was renewed. However, Russia signed the same type of 
contract with Germany, which became the famous Ribentrop-Molotov pact. Seventeen days 
after the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1st, 1939, Stalin decided to invade Poland 
from the East, ending the short period of Polish independence.  
 The plans of Hitler towards Poland were always clear; however Russia’s action was 
less understandable. When Germany attacked Russia on June 22 1941, the latter “did deny 
their claims to these territories assured them by their collaboration with Hitler” (Lednicki 
28). Therefore 1941 was a year when another Polish-Russian agreement was signed. Poland 
was represented by the government in exile stationed in London. Nonetheless, the Polish 
claim for investigation of disappeared officers in Russia was met with Stalin’s “breaking off 
diplomatic relation”, and “the Soviet authorities, in cooperation with a small group of Polish 
Communists and left-wing Socialist, proceeded to make plans for a pro-Soviet administration 
in liberated Poland” (Prazmowska 178).  The process was relatively quick and in 1944, with 
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the help of the Soviets, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) was created, as 
the only official government of Poland. Moreover, against expectations, Yalta Conference in 
1945 did not bring changes for Poles and for many, to this day it has been considered as “the 
ultimate betrayal by their western allies” (Lukowski 244). Stalin was assured that the 
previously created government in Poland would stay official government, but the condition 
was that it would have to be broadened by non communist members. At the end, the “Soviets 
complied, but only for a while. By 1948 the Communist Party of Poland, supported by the 
Soviets, was in complete control of the country” (Otfinoski 28). 
 As has been illustrated above, the mutual history of Russia and Poland until 1945 was 
complex and difficult.  However, there is no doubt that there was never a clear intention on 
the Russian side to have an independent Poland as a neighbor. By its actions it proved to 
favor the dichotomous nature of relations. Henry R. Huttenbach (1974) noticed that there is 
even a clash between two scholars – Polish, Oscar Halecki, and Russian Nicholas 
Riasanovsky – who tried to explain the reason for the violence of Polish Russian relations. 
Halecki claimed that the rise of the Muscovy dynasty became an embryo of Russian 
imperialism, which exists to the present day. On the other side, Riasanowvsky answered that 
Russian response to the Polish problem was caused by the Polish invasion in eleven century 
and its intervention during the Time of Troubles. While this might be justification, “it by no 
means discounted the fact of a long history of Russian expansionism with its own ideological 
rationales” (Hunczak 19).  
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1945-1989 and the fall of the USSR 
 
 The end of the war not only meant for Poland facing enormous devastation of the 
country, but also meant becoming a satellite state of Russia. Theoretically, Poland existed as 
a sovereign state, but in practice, there was hardly any political independence. From the end 
of 1947 until 1989, there was only one party in the Polish government – United Polish 
Workers’ Party (PZPR), which was based on the ideals of Marxism and Leninism. The 
character of political life in Poland has changed significantly in comparison to the pre-war 
period.. As Ray Taras wrote: “the constellation of political institutions in Poland has 
engendered oligarchic, centralist, and bureaucratic tendencies” (Taras 44).  Stalinist era 
doomed the Polish dream of sovereignty to misery. As a satellite state, Poland became a 
prolonged arm of Soviet Union and “new constitution was adopted, a carbon copy of the 
Soviet constitution” (Otfinoski 28). Additionally, personal freedoms disappeared and 
censorship was put in place. 
 Introduction of some of the communist policies was not limited to the borders of the 
USSR. Poland undertook a similar collectivization campaign, which ended in 1956, only 
because there was a change in the Polish leadership approach to the thought of Poland as a 
satellite state of the Soviet Union. Moreover, whatever ideas were especially prevalent and 
focused on during Stalinist era, started to fade away after Stalin’s death. This was perceived 
as a relatively advantageous situation for Poland willing to actually gain more control over its 
own politics. However, despite the changes in leadership of Communist Party, and the short 
period of stability on the Warsaw-Moscow line, Poland was not able to gain control over its 
politics. And this was the time, when economic troubles became evident. A series of strikes 
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occurred throughout the country as “the economy, mismanaged by the Russians for two 
decades, continued to decline” (Otfinoski 30). Poles’ anger was boiling and many delegated 
their voices to the Solidarity who represented them in talks with the authorities. However, at 
the beginning of 1980s, Polish government did not truly engage in talks or interactions with 
Solidarity. It was noted by Russian author Riasanovsky: 
 No regular contacts with the Solidarity leadership and the 
Catholic hierarchy aimed at creating a constructive and 
meaningful national consensus were initiated by the 
government. By exploiting its monopoly over the mass media 
and over the distribution of increasingly scarce food supplies 
and consumer goods, the government attempted to undermine 
the position of the opposition while at the same time strongly 
seconding Moscow’s accusations that Solidarity was 
attempting to subvert the political structure and international 
position of People’s Poland (Riasanovsky 554). 
 
This gave a clear message to the Poles that they should and could trust neither the home 
government nor USSR. This also illustrates, how regardless of changes in leadership in both 
states, Moscow managed to remain dominant with regards to the internal politics of Republic 
of Poland. 
 In December 1981, “Martial law had been declared by General Jaruzelslki” (Otfinoski 
38). However, as Anita Prazmowska stated: “The most striking feature of the period which 
followed was the fact that it was not the Communist Party, but the army which was 
authorized by the Soviet Union to assume control of Poland” (208). Once again, the influence 
of Soviet politics on Polish every day living was illustrated. The wave of Stalinist times came 
back, as many people got arrested and control over many aspects of citizens’ lives became 
apparent. Wojciech Jaruzelski “was the servant of the military interest within the Soviet 
apparatus, the batman of the Soviet marshals”. Moreover, “he had saved the Soviet Army 
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from a very unpleasant task” (Davies 495). Until today, nobody really has the knowledge, 
whether the Soviets would have invaded Poland if Jaruzelski had not stepped in. The 
explanations for the introduction of the martial law (called “stan wojenny” in Polish 
language) seem not to be clear either.  
 The end of the 1980s was different than the years before. The situation constantly 
changed throughout those years because the political, cultural and economic conditions in the 
USSR were also facing severe crisis, therefore limiting its ability to influence communist 
partners. Nicholas Riasanovsky stated: 
  
 When Mikhail Gorbachev was named general secretary, his 
mandate was to address this crisis, first by admitting it 
publicly. The government and the party spoke openly about 
economic problems: the slowing of economic growth, the 
negative effects on the standard of living, the dismal condition 
of agriculture, the poor quality of manufactured products, the 
failure to keep up with world developments in science and 
technology (including computing), and the huge proportion of 
the gross national product devoured by military needs (more 
than twice the percentage in the United States (586).  
 
The problems affected society in every single sphere, making reality “black and grey”, which 
resulted in widespread alcoholism. For instance, an access to most primary products such as 
milk or bread became a time consuming struggle, while stores were never out of mustard, 
vinegar and vodka. It occurred that porcelain factory workers got certain number of coffee 
cups, as an equivalent of their monthly salary. Both Andropov and his successor Gorbachev 
“tried to create a disciplined and sober work force with a renewed campaign against alcohol” 
(Evtuhov 787). The Perestroika and Glasnost reforms in Soviet Union were a clear signs for 
other satellite nations to follow. Poland was not any different. 
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 The military rulings of Jaruzelski left the opposition in a difficult situation, but 
Solidarity did not give up and continued its road towards freedom. 1989 was a breakthrough 
year for Poland. Jaruzelski agreed to the round-table talks. The outcome was a success for 
Solidarity, which was again declared legal, but there was a call for a new election. It was not 
fully open because 38% of the seats went to the Communists, 35% to Solidarity and only 
27% were up for grabs. The Presidency would stay in the hands of Jaruzelski, but the Senate 
would have all of its seats available in the election. Voting day came on June 4 and became a 
full success for Solidarity candidates who captured almost all seats. However, it is critical to 
point that the scraps of the communist regime were still in place leaving success limited. It 
was crucial for the Poles that “Soviet Foreign Office made an announcement without 
parallel” that they do not interfere “in the internal affairs of Poland” (Davies 504). 
 Then, Jaruzelski agreed to shorten his presidency and the constitution was changed. 
When Balcerowicz introduced shock therapy, and Walesa became the legitimized President, 
only then Poland became a sovereign country. At the same time, the Soviet Union was facing 
problems that were enormous, beginning with poor economic performances and ending on 
citizens’ social problems of every day lives. And although the actual fall of the Soviet Union 
was a surprise, judging by its performance during last years of its existence, it might have 
been expected.  
Gorbachev’s policies differed a lot from his predecessors. Not only was his attitude 
towards domestic matters different, but he allowed for more autonomy within satellite states, 
one of them being Poland. He liberalized foreign trade “and by the end of 1988 most 
ministries, enterprises, and other organizations were allowed to engage in foreign trade” 
(Ziegler 153). Nevertheless, economic openness was only the one side of the spectrum. 
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Along with economic transition, Glasnost was initiated, which “meant to expose the full 
extent of mismanagement, corruption, and falsification in the economic system, holding both 
management and workers up to the glare of public opinion” (Ziegler 153). The New 
Congress of People’s Deputies was created, which was elected by the voters in the election. 
This Congress had to choose The Supreme Soviet of USSR, which consisted of 500 
representatives. With the time passing by, they started to divide into different factions and 
Gorbachev’s power started to be more virtual than real, despite the fact that in 1990 the 
Congress elected him as a president. The opposition, on the other hand, called for faster 
political transformation and in “1990, Russia’s own Congress of People’s Deputies elected 
Yeltsin head of the Russian Supreme Soviet and thus leader of the Russian Republic” 
(Evtuhov 793).  
The political turmoil in the Soviet Union was perceived as a chance for political 
changes in Soviet Republics as well as in satellite states. The strong nationalism in most of 
those countries pose another difficulty for Russia that was deepened in crisis. Gorbachev, 
aware of the difficult situation at home, as well as outside Russia, finally “accepted the idea 
of allowing the constituent republics an autonomy verging on independence, and joined 
forces with Yeltsin” (Longworth 295).  The latter became the President of Russian 
Federation on June 12, 1991. This is what Philip Longworth wrote about following event: 
 
At midnight on 31 December 1991 the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Russia’s fourth empire, would cease to 
exist. He spoke with sadness and with dignity. Not so Boris 
Yeltsin. He moved into presidential offices in the Kremlin 
before Gorbachev had time to clear his desk, and threw a party 
there (298). 
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This chapter of Russian history was to be closed. But as it will be shown in following 
chapters, much the legacy of the history is shaping today’s relations between Republic of 
Poland and Russian Federation. 
To sum up, the common affairs between Poland and Russia after the WWII were a 
one-way street. It is hard to talk about any relations when one country is dominating other in 
every aspect of its existence. The reminiscence of partitions that took place in 1772 and in 
1793 was very vivid in every day life. Rusification process that was initiated after the third 
partition in 1795, in many aspects resembled Stalinization. As a matter of fact, the history of 
Polish-Russian relation shows turbulent events, but on the other hand, it illustrates constant 
attempts to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. Poland’s intervention in Days of 
Troubles and Russian constant meddling in Polish situation left little room for good partner-
to-partner relations. The legacy of the past is visible and present in current events of Polish 
and Russian politics.  
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CHAPTER III. CURRENT RELATIONS AND THEIR NATURE 
 
Polish and Russian foreign policy and their characteristics after transitions 
 
 Both Polish and Russian foreign policy changed dramatically after the collapse of 
communism. The change was caused by two different factors. Russia was very nostalgic and 
wanted to keep up with its status of superpower but on the other hand it faced the tough 
reality of being stripped of all super-power aspects. Poland wanted to cut ties with its eastern 
neighbor and turn towards the West and the European Union, as well as the United States. 
The paths might be different, however the geopolitics did not change and the reality is 
that both states do have to cooperate. The relations after the collapse were difficult and still 
remain so. Therefore next subdivision of this thesis will be devoted that complex bond 
between Poland and Russia. 
During the cold war Poland was subjugated to Russia and in practice foreign policy of 
Soviet Union became a policy of Poland, despite the fact that Poland was not one of the 
Soviet Republics but was “only” a satellite state. The situation dramatically changed after the 
collapse of communism in both countries. The directions, chosen by those two countries 
differed from one another, and this was rather a natural thing.  
Poland, after becoming a fully independent nation became very eager to join the 
European community. There were many reasons for that, starting with economic help and 
ending with political stability and strength against other nations, including Russia. Becoming 
the member of the European Community was considered a privilege to a degree, and joining 
the elite club requires some sacrifices. Poland was ready to do so and applied for a 
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membership in the community in May of 1990, which seems to be relatively fast considering 
the fact that it was still during the Soviet Union existence. However, the formal application 
for the membership was handed to the EU in April of 1994. Poland joined the European 
Union on January 1st 2004. For the first time the country could be part of the Europe that has 
a plan for mutual friendship and economic and social benefits.  
Fear of both Germany and Russia was still present in the minds of many Poles, but, 
Polish “unification negotiations, resulted in two fundamental political accords with the new 
Germany” (Biskupski 185). One recognized the Odra-Nysa border between Poland and 
Germany and the second recognized German minority in Poland and became responsible for 
protecting their rights. Western Europe and United States of the world became crucial for 
Polish relations. Biskupinski recalled the famous words of 1992 Polish Foreign Minister 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski who said that the main goal of modern foreign policy is “integration 
with West European structures and institutions (with a) strategic objective in the security 
sphere…to join NATO” (185).  
Polish membership in NATO became a priority for policy makers because of the fact 
that it “provides a link with the United States and an assurance that Germany will remain 
bound” (Prizel 121). Relations with the US were also put on the Polish agenda, because of 
the historical role of US in the European continent. United States was supposed to be a 
balance to Polish European partners who many times were not reliable in their actions 
(French and Great Britain’s refusal to help Poland in the first weeks after the WWII broke 
out). Polish geopolitical placement put the foreign policy in difficulty which meant they were 
seeking constant balance. Poland as first the potential and then an actual member of the EU 
and NATO was inconvenient for Russia, but their mutual relations during this period will be 
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described in the next subdivision of this chapter. On the other hand, Polish foreign policy 
was also very Ukraine-oriented in the East. Polish long relations with Ukraine, which parts 
used to be home of many Poles played a very important historic, cultural and symbolic role. 
Ilya Prizel summarized best why Ukraine has been so important for Poland. He said that: 
“Polish analysts initially envisioned that their country would serve as a bridge between 
Ukraine and Europe, but many Ukrainian nationalists saw Poland as an escape hatch from 
Russian domination” (139). Ukrainian-Polish ties could be called cordial. One of the most 
successful cooperation can be noticed between Ukrainian and Polish NGO’s and academic 
institutions which “has reached a high level of intensity, and is now one of the few real 
success stories in Polish Ukrainian relations (Wolczuk 48). However, Ukraine remains 
outside European Union leaving a question mark whether the strategic partnership with 
Poland could be further developed. Therefore “Polish-Ukrainian relations tend to be 
criticized for being long rhetoric but short on substance” (Wolczuk 48). 
Polish circumstances and foreign policy changed slightly after joining NATO in 1999 
and the European Union in 2004. The situation became a little bit paradoxical. Poland after 
reaching the goal of becoming officially a part of the European community seemed to change 
priorities from Europeans to United States. It joined the US in the war in Iraq, and became 
the second largest contributor after Great Britain. This happened despite general 
disagreement about the war within the European Union. The long relationship of Great 
Britain with United States could be understood, but Polish commitment to support an 
unwanted war was nothing a question mark within the EU. The hope of advancing the EU to 
a higher level of mutual cooperation was questioned and halted. Jurgen Habermas and Jaques 
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Derrida noticed that “the war made Europeans conscious of the failure of their common 
foreign policy, a failure that has been a long time in the making” (4).  
This hard to understand move changed the image of Poland’s place within the 
European Union. In 2005, when the conservative party “Law and Justice” (PiS) won both 
parliamentary and presidential election the foreign policy changed again. This time the 
pragmatic approach that used to be the motto of the policy in last years changed to an 
aggressive and distrustful policy. Stephen Larrabee described the new Polish policy as the 
one that “seeks to enhance Polish national interests, which has led to conflicts with the EU 
and some of Poland's neighbors, particularly Germany” (117) and later Russia.  
Russia also went in a different direction after the fall of the USSR. The empire, which 
according to many Russians was a natural state of reality, suddenly collapsed. Many did not 
know whether to treat Russia as an empire similar to Soviet Union, as an entity that inherited 
what used to be Soviet, or rather treat Russia as a new nation and opposite to the imperialistic 
USSR. For the end of the XX century, the situation was totally new, and most of the actors 
were not prepared for it.  
There was no doubt that the foreign policy of Russia had to be changed, because the 
Cold War was over, and Russia did not have the tools and strength to continue an 
imperialistic approach towards the neighbors. For Russians the end of USSR was the end of 
an era. Something that used to be so natural for them ended shockingly fast and leaving the 
entire population in some kind of national identity limbo. Bobo Lo wrote: “With the end of 
the USSR and the simultaneous collapse of state and empire, it faced the immense challenge 
of developing a post-imperial identity in conditions of chronic political and economic 
uncertainty, and with no clear model to emulate” (20). Russia did not want to become a 
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regular country and for the policy makers “more typical is the opinion that Russia, by virtue 
of its imperial past and identity, simply does not have the option of becoming a nation-state 
like the others” (Lo 21). 
The problem with this approach is that Russia definitely wanted to be treated as the 
continuation of the Soviet Union in this sense of being a superpower and keeping the 
privileges associated with the fact. Margot Light wrote: “The problem was the insistence on 
great-power status frequently alternated with demands for economic assistance, and the 
combination of being a supplicant for aid while wanting to be accepted as a great power, 
together with a tendency to indulge in declaratory politics, made Russian foreign policy seem 
very inconsistent” (229). 
The inconsistency of the new Russian foreign policy was not created only by the 
factor mentioned above. It is also important to mention that the problem was technical in 
nature. The change within the government included many miscommunications and it took 
time until all parts of the government involved in making decisions were clear who is 
responsible for what in making foreign policy. The President as an executive had the 
privilege of shaping the foreign policy. However, there were also the Foreign Minister and 
Duma who also had rights to contribute to policy making. This disorganization was many 
times in the way of making a clear stand on issues.  
Slowly, the foreign policy of Russia was developing and became more visible and 
clear to the outside world. What policy was created can be seen in the table 1 below. Three 
concepts: Foreign Policy, National Security and Military were adapted in different stages and 
consisted of different ideas. 
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Table 1. Russian Federation foreign policy creation process 
 
 Foreign Policy Concept Military Concept National Security 
Concept 
Ye
ar
  
Key points Key points Key points 
19
93
 
• First ever formulation of 
foreign policy priorities 
• Assertion of prominent 
international role for 
Russian Federation 
• “near abroad” focus 
 
• Expression of harsh 
stance about 
Russia’s national 
interests as a 
response to 
perceived 
suspicious Western 
intensions towards 
Russia 
 
 
19
97
 
  • Emphasis on 
country’s 
changing external 
and internal 
conditions  
• Formulation of 
threats posed by 
domestic 
problems 
 
20
00
 
• Verbalization of 
hardening foreign policy 
• Legitimization of 
the internal military 
intervention  
• Looser conditions 
for nuclear 
weapons usage 
 
 
The table shows three types of concepts that attempt to define principles and key points of 
Russian Federation foreign policy. Those are: Foreign Policy Concept, Military Concept and 
National Security Concept. Each of those doctrines had two versions after the year of 1991, 
which may indicate two things. First, it may be caused by simple fact that there was a shift in 
power from Yeltsin to Putin, whose perceptions about Russian foreign policy were not the 
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same. The initial concepts of 1993 and 1997 were introduced by Boris Yeltsin, but then 
replaced by Vladimir Putin in 2000. Vladimir Putin took different approach towards foreign 
policy. Although in the first stages Russia was not reluctant to express its stance, Foreign 
Policy Concept of 2000 seems to be harsher and very protective of the national interests. In 
1993 the “concept portrayed a far less benign view about Russia’s external environment than 
the rather idealistic and uncritically pro-Western policy Russia was pursuing at that time” 
(Light 227). The policy of 2000 became more pragmatic. Second issue that may be indicated 
by changes made can be lack of coherence. Definition of basic concepts was supposed to 
ease Russian quest for its foreign policy orientation, but there was no agreement on country’s 
place in the world. “The disparate foreign policy views expressed by the legislature, the 
military and various presidential spokesmen did not reflect the contents of either document” 
(Light 227). 
But coming back to the most recent foreign policy formulations, it has to be noted 
that 2000 Concepts included the problems of terrorism and separatism, which did not appear 
to be accounted for in the ‘90s. For international community, the most controversial change 
in the policy of 2000 is envisaging “looser conditions under which Russia might resort to 
nuclear weapons” (Light 227). Igor Ivanon, the Foreign Minister of that time stated: “We do 
not intend to and will not relinquish our national interests... Therefore, when toughness is 
called for, there will be toughness. However, this should not be interpreted as confrontation 
or aggression; it should be seen as the firm, constructive defense of national interests” 
(People’s daily). New doctrines also took domestic problems into consideration, and “if 
domestic threats are perceived to have external causes, there is logic to the more assertive 
foreign policy stance that emerges in the new doctrines and concepts” (Light 228). And 
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although the “near abroad” focus has appeared in 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, policies of 
the new millennia are those which “provoked accusations of neo-imperialism” (Light 228). 
Russian Federation seems to not always be respectful toward political sovereignty and 
independence of “near abroad”, in particular successor states. 
Russian foreign policy has changed, and along with the conceptual changes there 
have been also technical changes. The difficulties that occurred while Boris Yeltsin was in 
power slowly faded away during Putin’s presidency. The miscommunications that took place 
before have been sorted out and improved. Margot Light continued her analysis and wrote: 
“President Putin’s background, history and personality are very different from those of his 
predecessor” and “he has a better relationship with his ministers and with the Duma and a 
very different management and foreign policy style” (229).  It ought to be remembered that 
Russian foreign policy is still changing and we may expect this process to continue in the 
future as it faces presidential elections in 2008. Russian Federation has been trying to 
establish its position after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new identity search 
accompanies the quest for the new place in the international political order. However, there is 
no doubt that “Putin turned Russian foreign policy around 180 degrees” (Treisman 63). 
  
Polish-Russian relations after 1991 
 
 The mutual relations of Russia and Poland after the collapse of communism were 
difficult. After years of disagreements, fights and subjugation the factors of geopolitics did 
not help in mutual relations, especially after a long history of disagreement. Poland was 
perceived as a long-time rebel for Russia whereas Russia was a clear imperialistic power for 
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Poles. This image is still present and did not change. However, one thing is certain that new 
relations had to be initiated and a foreign policy shaped because the political reality did not 
allow for both states to completely ignore one another because of their common border. 
 While Russia was looking for new ways in the new world order, and tried to find the 
new identity on the world stage, Poland looked for membership in NATO and the European 
Community at that time. The first visit to Moscow of Polish president Lech Walesa took 
place in 1992 and was the very first official visit of the independent head of Polish state. 
Walesa was not pretentious and therefore relatively successful in making Boris Yeltsin 
remove Russian troops from Poland, which was again a symbol of the next step in Polish 
complete independence. Walesa was similar in a certain degree to Yeltsin. Both had difficult 
positions at that time, because the new environment put both presidents to the test. With no 
democratic experience on either side, both had to find their way of operating in the new 
technical environment to become and be a significant part of creating the new ways of 
communication among the new institutions that were being built. 
 Yeltsin visited Poland in 1993 and surprised the government by supporting Polish 
membership in NATO structures. This was a very positive message for Polish officials. 
However, the euphoria did not last too long, because “this apparent concession triggered a 
barrage of criticism across the political spectrum in Russia, forcing Yeltsin to reverse himself 
thereby undermining his credibility and underscoring Russia’s endemic instability” (Prizel 
133). Russia became very defensive when it came to the problem of expanding NATO. The 
loud opposition was understood and taken seriously by the West, but Poland was even more 
eager to join the treaty. The eagerness could be easily understood at that time because of the 
fact that Russia did not guarantee its development of successful democracy, and Poland 
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definitely wanted to avoid becoming trapped again in a situation of not being in NATO and 
being next to an undemocratic Russia at the same time. Poland however was not ready to join 
NATO at any cost and the awareness of mutual agreement between Russia and expanded 
NATO would have to take place. On the other hand loud protests of Russia could again be 
perceived as trying to influence the politics and foreign affairs of Poland. It seemed that it 
“has provoked a long and occasionally bitter effort by the Russians to assert their rights to 
some ill-defined influence over the former Soviet empire” (Biskupski 189). 
 Russian approach was natural for her officials, because it was inherited from USSR, 
but Russia was not USSR anymore. The government tried its best to create an opposite 
picture, in which Russia still has power and the right to dictate its stance. Biskupski wrote: 
“Until Russia emerges as a healthy, constructive member of the European community, 
Poland’s only recourse is to look to its own security and avoid provocative actions in the 
east” (190). 
 Poland finally joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004, and Russia 
despite many problems made its peace with that. However, the relationships became harder 
in the new millennium because of a few situations in which both countries had some 
interests; despite the fact that President Aleksander Kwasniewski did his best to balance the 
foreign policy of Poland with west and east (He visited Moscow multiple times along with 
calls to President Putin). President Vladimir Putin even visited Poland in 2002 giving hope 
for the observers that the mutual relations will improve. However, next events showed 
differently.  
The very first problem that shattered Polish-Russian relations was the political crisis 
in Ukraine, known to the world as the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution took place 
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in November of 2004 and lasted until January of 2005. Ukraine was ruled by President 
Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich who had support of Russia. The 
country was widely corrupted and controlled by the elite. The reality was that “the oligarchs 
were able to operate their businesses without fear of independent oversight” (Karatnycky 35). 
In 2004, when the new presidential election was coming, the charismatic opposition leader 
and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko was leading in the polls and was a hope for 
the better Ukraine. He was backed by the Western countries, whereas Yanukovich was the 
leader with Russian support. This support was not unofficial and hidden; rather it was public 
and widely known to people interested in Ukrainian politics. When the election took place, 
the results were shocking. Yanukovich won by 2 percent despite the fact that the non-
governmental exit polls showed that Yushchenko held a clear win by almost 10 percent. For 
the opposition it was clear that there was fraud. For example, “the OSCE reported that almost 
12 percent of polling stations received at least 10 percent more ballots than there were 
registered voters in their precincts, in contravention of rules stating that no more than 3 
percent extra ballots can be issued” (D’Anieri 2004). The result was that opposition 
organized and did not accept the results. Independence Square in Kiev became the center of 
opposition that protested massively and demanded new elections under independent 
monitoring. Russian President Vladimir Putin called and congratulated Yanukovich for his 
win, which was a clear sign of his support of status quo.  Poland along with Lithuania 
strongly supported the Ukrainian right to fair election. Many politicians visited Ukraine to 
show support. The biggest contributors were Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
Kwasniewski became a part of the round table negotiating new election.  
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 Russia did not like the fact that Poland actively supported Yushchenko. As a matter 
of fact, Russia did not like the fact the West united in favor of new, free elections in Ukraine. 
Andrew Wilson wrote: “As well as fraud (greater than their own) the Russians blamed 
manipulation from abroad. Those who were more upset and suspicious of the elections 
“blamed spies and mountains of US money, seeing the US playing the same zero-sum ‘great 
geopolitical game’, and trying to create a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around Russia” (175). Putin 
along with Kuchma criticized the idea of repeating the election, despite the fact that the 
evidence for fraud was visible and very apparent. At the end Yushchenko got his chance to 
prove the point and won by a wide margin in repeated election on December 26 of 2004. 
Polish-Russian relations received a blow after Orange Revolution because at the end of 2004 
became began the cooling relations between the two countries. Comments such as this one 
below show how the Russian attitude towards Poland was. 
 
If Ukraine, even if independent, does not have special, allied 
relations with Russia, its fledgling statehood can easily be 
turned into an anti-Russian bridgehead, and it will eventually 
be transformed into a second Poland…a historico-cultural 
project, which is alien to Russia (Wilson 177). 
 
On the other hand President Kwasniewski was not any different and stated straightforward 
that “for every great power Russia without Ukraine is better than Russia with Ukraine” 
(Wilson 193). 
 The implication of Polish support for Ukraine had a quick response. In November of 
2005 Russia imposed an embargo on Polish exported meat and the ban was explained by 
veterinary certificates that were supposedly made by Polish exporters later shown to be 
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fraudulent. Poland was surprised by the situation, having had a good experience with 
exporting meat to the EU at the same time, where standards are very high. Later, it was 
promised that the problem would be fixed. After investigation, Polish authorities noticed that 
the falsified certificates were issued outside Poland and were not made by polish exporters. 
All traces led to Moscow and participation of Russia secret services. The Polish newspaper 
“Dziennik” published on November 25th 2006 the article describing the whole situation based 
on the prosecutors’ investigation and pointed to Russia’s officials as the ones who initiated 
the action and refused to help Polish prosecutors.   
 According to “Moskowskij Komsomolec” the embargo is very political form of 
punishment for the support of Ukraine in the Orange Revolution as well as electing the 
Kaczynski brothers who have been very skeptical about Russian intentions (Malczyk). 
Poland responded by using a veto of EU-Russia negotiations on a new mutual agreement. 
The Polish veto was perceived very negatively within the EU, but a Russian embargo became 
a priority for Polish authorities.  On November 22nd, 2006 Interfax Central Europe published 
a letter written by Vladimir Putin to the Financial Times. The letter talked about “creating 
fresh division lines in Europe” and was perceived as a ‘veiled warning’ to Poland and other 
Central and Eastern European countries” (Onet.pl).  
 The European Union supported Poland in the “fight” over the embargo but 
resolutions have been limited and rather slow. Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of 
European Commission, said in May of 2007 that the Russian embargo on Polish meat is 
discrimination, and presented a widely repeated argument that if Polish meat was not meeting 
high veterinary standards of the EU it would not be allowed to be exported with the Union. 
Therefore the Russian stand is not understandable (Wirtualna Polska). The Polish veto is still 
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valid and the embargo of Russia on Polish meat became the problem of the European Union 
as a whole.  
 Another important situation that played an important role in shaping the current 
Russian-Polish relationship was the crisis in Estonia. In April of 2007 the Estonian 
authorities removed the monument to USSR soldiers in Tallinn. Following this event the 
Russian minority in Estonia actively protested on the streets. Because of these 
demonstrations several people got injured. Russia reacted very angrily and criticized the 
decision. Exports of Russian oil to Estonia were halted (although it was claimed to be based 
on technical grounds). The Estonian embassy in Moscow was besieged by pro-Kremlin neo-
Nazi youth group forcing the diplomats to go back to Tallinn. Poland supported Estonia 
claiming that an independent country has the right to remove monuments or replace them. 
Moreover, the US Secretary of State clearly stated that Estonia had every right to remove 
monument (Bajerski). President Lech Kaczynski officially called President Toomasam 
Hendrik Ilves and expressed his sympathy towards Estonian actions. Similar to the case of 
Orange Revolution Russia did not approve of Polish involvement in this affair. The mayor of 
Moscow Yury Luzhkov, who is also one of the leaders of United Russia party, called for a 
boycott of Estonian and Polish products in Russia. He said that “when we see what is done to 
Russians in Estonia and Poland we should not only limit our actions to protesting but also 
fixing those problems by real means” (Lead.pl). In the conflict Poland expressed support, 
which it had every right to do so. Russia also had her chance to express her dissatisfaction. In 
the eyes of many Poles, Russia tries its best to make everything political and its own way. 
This does not help in any way to improve the relationship.  
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 Another incident that became very challenging for Russia, is the US plan of making 
Poland and Czech Republic as part of the Missile Defense system. Poland and Czech 
Republic agreed to place parts of the system on their territories. Poland would then posses the 
missiles, and Czech Republic would install the radar components for the whole system. 
Russia sees this as a threat expanding American defense system next to her borders. The 
balance of nuclear power, according to Russia, would be changed and would lead to 
hardening of Russian foreign policy. Roman Joch wrote that modern technology allows 
intercepting only limited number of missiles. According to Americans, the concept of the 
defense system is targeted against enemies and unpredictable nations that possess only 
limited arsenal. The idea is that “in no way this would limit Russian capabilities of fighting 
force” (Joch 78). Russia is aware of these sentiments but it raises an alarm and may have 
objections because again, something is being done without its consent. Paradoxically, Russia 
has not expressed its willingness to talk to Poland about the issue. Officially, it has not 
refused to talk, but no confrontation regarding this subjects has not take place. Despite the 
fact that Poland is very interested in cooperation with Russia, Russia will only talk with the 
US. 
 The European Union and NATO would like to discuss the situation in an international 
forum; however this would not intervene in the internal policies of the independent states. 
The secretary general of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that some of the Russian 
arguments are simply not true. He noted those ten missiles in Poland and the radar in the 
Czech Republic will not have any impact on Russian security. Russian claims that it was not 
informed of the plans are also incorrect. Russian advisers at NATO were informed by 
Washington in 2007 (O2). Russia successfully put the case on the international agenda at the 
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G8 meeting in Heiligendamm in 2007 and made it out of its claims about security. However, 
Poland and Czech Republic look at the system as gaining some importance on the 
international stage as well as getting military and perhaps financial aid from the US for 
supporting the system. In this case both countries are looking at their own interests, and EU 
and NATO are aware of it. 
 Finally, the last issue that has had a significant influence on Polish-Russian relations, 
and which illustrates that Russia behaves imperialistically is the energy policy of Russia. 
Poland imports 94.5% of crude oil and 84% of gas of total imports from Russia. Despite the 
fact that Poland’s domestic production of natural gas meets 39% of total demand, and there 
are imports from Germany and Norway, Russia almost has a monopoly over exporting those 
resources to Poland (Smith 11). Smith wrote that “Poles can cite examples of Russia using its 
energy monopoly for economic and financial advantage in Poland, but few can provide 
evidence that Russian pressure has a measurable impact on Polish foreign or security 
policies” (48). One of the examples of unfair treatment could be building an undersea 
pipeline that would avoid Poland. When Poland discovered that Russia installed an optic 
cable along with the Yamal pipeline, Russia convinced Poland to leave the cable for future 
revenues that would come from building Yamal II next to Yamal I. Unfortunately for Poland, 
the plans turned out to be different and Russian company Gazprom with support of Putin 
decided to build an undersea pipeline to Germany. Economically, the plan does not make 
sense and is highly inefficient comparing to Yamal II, however “Poles are convinced that the 
undersea project is Putin’s way of demonstrating to Poland and Belarus that Russia is 
prepared to invest large sums of money to display Russia’s energy dominance and eliminate 
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the possibility that Poland or Belarus could use additional pipelines as leverage with 
Moscow” (Smith 49).  
 The conflict with Estonia and cut off of oil transport (despite the fact the Russian 
explained that it was a “technical” problem) to that country show that Russia approach is 
clear and that it uses energy as one of the tools on the political stage. The Polish parliament 
aware of the situation, voted a bill at the beginning of 2007 that would increase oil and gas 
reserves in case Russia should halt exports (Kuligowski). In April of 2007 Russia cut 
supplies to Belarus, which directly impacted Poland and Lithuania.  
 The relations of Russia and Poland after the collapse of communism have been very 
difficult and complex. The diplomatic contacts have been limited to a minimum and it seems 
that relations are worsening. It is important to notice that Poland is not in a unique position of 
being badly treated by Russia. Poland has become less important in Russia’s political 
consideration, since the Russian government continues to show its strength and superiority 
on every occasion. The cases of Estonia and Ukraine showed that it is incredibly hard for 
Russia to get over the collapse of Soviet Union. It treats its neighbors as if it forgets that the 
era of Soviet Republics is over.  
 
Public opinion and Polish-Russian relations     
 
 Official relations of the governments and politicians might be deteriorating; however 
it is interesting to look at the public opinion and its view on the relations. This will give us a 
clear picture of how average citizens of these countries perceive of those neighboring. First 
are the relations of Poland and Russia in the Polish public’s eyes. Tables 2 and 3 present 
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changes in public opinion concerning relation between two countries, and the variation in 
them over the particular time periods. 
 
Table 2. Polish opinion on Russian-Polish relations in 1990 
 
How do you perceive 
Polish Russian 
relations? 
May-June 1990 
Good 15% 
Nor good, nor bad 61% 
Bad 14% 
Hard to say 9% 
Total 99% 
Source: OBOP, May/December 1990: “Opinie o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich”, 
  http://www.tns-global.pl/archive-report/id/1058, accessed September 11, 2007. 
    
Table 3.  Polish opinion on Russian-Polish relations         
How do you 
perceive Polish 
Russian relations?  
IV 2000 II 2002 IV 2005 VI 2005 XII 2005 
Good 2% 19% 6% 3% 3% 
Nor good, nor bad 47% 66% 55% 33% 41% 
Bad 40% 9% 31% 57% 51% 
Hard to say 10% 6% 8% 7% 5% 
Total 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: CBOS, December 2005: “Opinie o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich”, 
http://www.zigzag.pl/cbos/details.asp?q=a1&id=3452, accessed September 11, 2007. 
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Table 2 shows that in 1990, a majority of Polish public opinion on Russian-Polish relations 
considered those relations as neither good nor bad. This indifference may be understood as 
leaning toward negative feelings, but not strongly negative. Only 14% of the people thought 
the relations were bad, and 15% believed they were good.  
Table 3 shows the responses to the same question; however the poll was conducted 10 
years later. Four in ten of the respondents thought the relations were bad, which is a 
significant increase from 14% in 1990. Interestingly, in February of 2002, after the visit of 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in Poland, the good opinions jumped to 19% from 2% in 
2000. On the other hand, the bad opinions increased from 31% to 57% in just two months in 
2005. The reason for that may be the celebration of the end of the World War II in Moscow. 
The event was perceived as was controversial for Poles, because Poland was not mentioned 
as one of the allies in defeating Nazi Germany. In general, those two tables show the 
deterioration of opinion, which would match the general attitudes of both governments. 
 Table 4 and 5 both show answers to a similar question: “How do you perceive 
Russian-Polish relations?”, but the poll was taken in Russia. These tables cover the year of 
1990 and period from 2000 to 2005. This allows us to observe the variation in the opinion of 
Russians, and compare it to the answers given by Polish public opinion. Opinion in Russia 
shows the same trends as in Poland. In 1990 only 16% of Russian thought that the relations 
were bad, most thought they were neither good nor bad. In August of 2005, every third 
person perceived the relations as unfriendly. Even comparing to the answers from 2001, it is 
apparent that more and more Russians perceive Poland as having unfriendly approach 
towards their country. 
 
 42 
 
 
Table 4. Russian opinion on Russian-Polish relations 1990 
 
How do you perceive 
Russian-Polish 
relations? 
May-June 1990 
Good 21% 
Nor good, nor bad 54% 
Bad 16% 
Hard to say 9% 
Total 100% 
Source: OBOP, May/December 1990: “Opinie o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich”, 
  http://www.tns-global.pl/archive-report/id/1058, accessed September 11, 2007. 
 
Table 5. Russian-Polish relations 
Do you think Poland is 
friendly or unfriendly 
towards Russia? 
6-7 October 2001 22-23 January 2005 20-21 August 2005 
Friendly 57% 47% 35% 
Unfriendly 25% 23% 32% 
Hard to say 19% 30% 33% 
Total 101% 100% 100% 
Source: POF, August 30, 2005: “Russian-Polish Relations”, 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/Poland/ed053415, accessed 
September 11, 2007 
 
 Table 6 allows us to look at two different kinds of perceptions, which are separate but 
parallel. One is about Russia as a country, the other about the Russians as the people.   
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Table 6. Polish perception of Russia                            Russian perception of Russians 
What is your feeling towards 
Russia? 
February 
2005 
What is your 
feeling towards 
Russians? 
February 2005 
 Postive 23% Positive 39% 
Negative 18% Negative 9% 
Indifferent 55% Indifferent 49% 
Hard to say 4% Hard to say 3% 
Total 100% Total 100% 
Source: TNS OBOP, February 2005: “Wolimy Rosjan of Rosji”, 
http://isp.org.pl/files/7341595190709408001117722340.pdf, accessed September 11, 
2007. 
 
According to Table 6, in 2005, the majority of Poles felt indifferent about Russia, and 49% 
felt the same about Russians as people. Only 23% of Poles felt positive about Russia, but 
39% had the same feeling about Russians. Negative feelings towards country of Russia were 
declared by 18% of Poles, whereas negative feelings towards its people were expressed by 
only 9%. This is very interesting, because it shows that Poles have more positive feelings 
towards Russians than Russia itself.  
 Table 7 shows the same question asked in Russia, illustrating the attitudes of Russians 
towards Poland as a country. The poll was taken in Russia by the Public Opinion Foundation 
(FOM), which is the non-profit organization operating in Russia. As we see from the poll 
40% of the Russians feel positive about Poland, the country, and 51% felt the same about 
Poles, which is a significant difference. When we combine all negative feelings towards 
Poland, the country, we get 29%, whereas only 14% of the respondents had negative 
approach towards Polish people.   
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Table 7. Russian perception of Poland                                 Russian perception of Poles 
Comparing your current attitude towards 
Poland with what you felt about Poland 
previously, which of the following 
statements comes closest to your own view? 
December 
7, 2006 
Do you 
personally 
like Poles or 
not? 
2005 
I have always positive feelings about Poland 40% 
I had positive feelings about Poland before, 
but I have more negative feeling about that 
country now 
18% 
Yes 51% 
I had negative feelings about Poland before, 
but I have more positive feeling about that 
country now 
1% No 14% 
I have always had negative feelings about 
Poland. 
10% 
Hard to answer 30% 
Hard to 
answer 
36% 
Total 99% Total 101% 
Sources: FOM, December 7, 2006: “Russian, Poland and the EU”, 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/blocks/russ_europe/ed064824, accessed 
September 11, 2007.  
FOM, August 30, 2005: “Russian-Polish relations”, 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/souzniki/Poland/ed05
3415, accessed September 11, 2007. 
 
 
Around third of the people said it was hard to answer. We see that the path is similar. 
Russians feel more positively about Poles than Poland itself. Therefore the polls have shown 
that respondents sympathize with citizens of the countries, but are less positive about the 
countries of those citizens.  
 The problems of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution were widely published in the 
media; therefore there were a variety of polls showing opinions on the Ukraine in both 
Russia and Poland. Let us examine the differences. Table 8 and 9 will show the attitudes of 
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Poles and Russians towards Ukrainians who participated in the Orange Revolution. The 
question asked in the polls, which were done by CBOS and FOM were similar. 
 
Table 8. Polish sympathy 
 
In the last days there were mass protests 
in Ukraine. Who do you think is your 
sympathy with? 
 
December 2004 
With supporters of Yushchenko (pro 
Europe) 
54% 
With supporters of Yanukovich (pro 
Russia) 
2% 
Do not sympathies with any sides  37% 
Hard to say 8% 
Total 101% 
Source: CBOS, December 2004: “Reakcje na wydarzenia na Ukrainie”, 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_191_04.PDF, accesed September 11, 2007. 
 
We see that Poles were more supportive of Yushchenko and his supporters than the Russian 
respondents. More than a half of respondents in Poland (54%) declared their sympathy 
towards Yushchenko supporters, whereas only 2% felt this way towards Yanukovich 
supporters. Russian respondents answered differently to Poles. Only 6% of them declared 
sympathy towards the supporters of pro-European Yushchenko, while 25% of the 
respondents declared antipathy. 
 
 
 46 
 
 
Table 9. Russian sympathy                                            Who would be a better President? 
 
Do you feel sympathy or antipathy 
towards the participants in mass rallies 
in Yushchenko’s support, or are you 
indifferent about them?  
December 
23 2004 
Which of the 
candidates would 
be a better president 
for Ukraine? 
December 
23 2004 
Sympathy 6% Yushchenko 7% 
Antipathy  25% 
Yanukovich 39% 
Indifferent 52% 
Hard to answer  17% 
Hard to answer 54% 
Total 100% Total 100% 
Source: FOM, December2004:“Ukraine’s Presidential Election”, 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edom0451/edomt0451/edomt0451_1/ed045
109, accessed September 11, 2007. 
 
More than a half of Russians (52%) Russians felt indifferent about the topic, and the number 
could have been expected to be lower, taking under consideration President Putin’s 
involvement in Ukrainian elections. 39% of Russians declared that Yanukovich would be a 
better president for Ukraine, while only 7% thought Yushchenko would be better Ukrainian 
president. This numbers show, that Peoples’ perspectives somehow reflect tendencies of both 
governments. Poland supported Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution, and Russia 
supported Yanukovich. 
 The problem of Russian embargo on Polish meat was also noticed by both societies; 
therefore below are presented some polls that touch on this topic. Table 8 shows the opinions 
of Poles on motivations of Russian government and its embargo on polish meat.  
 47 
 
 
Table 10. Opinions on embargo 
 
What are the motives of Russians in 
placing embargo on polish meat? 
December 2005 
Political and targeted against Poland 73% 
Understandable protection of Russian 
interior market 
15% 
Hard to say 12% 
Total 100% 
Source: CBOS, December 2005: “Opinie o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich”, 
“http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_202_05.PDF”, accessed September 11, 
2007. 
 
In Poles’ eyes the embargo was clearly political and it was targeted against Poland. 73% of 
Poles responded that the motives were political. Only 15% considered the embargo as 
understandable. Following the decision of embargo, Poland vetoed the negotiations of the EU 
with Russia. Let us see whether Russian public was aware of this situation. Table 11 presents 
the opinion of Russians on the negotiations. However, it is crucial to mention that 61% of all 
respondents did not have any idea that veto was placed on the EU forum, leaving the 
impression that Poland and the EU is not on Russian citizens’ mind. Therefore, below are 
opinions of 39% of all respondents, which are those who actually knew that EU-Russia 
negotiations were vetoed. Table shows, that 12% of total respondents had the opinion of veto 
being the result of Russian embargo on Polish meat. Interestingly the lowest percentage of 
 48 
 
 
the public thought that the veto was an outcome of “long-standing negative feeling toward 
Russia”. 
 
Table 11. Russian opinion on Polish veto  
 
In your opinion, why did Poland veto the 
Russia-EU talks? (39% of the sample 
responded knew about veto) 
December 7, 2006 
It is a reaction to Russia’s import ban on 
Polish meat 
12% 
It has to do with economic reasons, 
Poland has its own reasons, profit from 
them 
3% 
Poland dislikes Russia, wants to harm us 3% 
It has to do with Russia’s export of energy 
resources abroad 
2% 
Poland has bad leaders 2% 
This is politics, political reasons  1% 
Poland did not make this decision 
independently 
1% 
Poland has long-standing negative 
feelings towards Russia 
1%< 
Other  2% 
Hard to answer 14% 
Source: FOM, December 7 2006: “Russia, Poland and the EU”, 
http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2006/edomt0648_4/ed064814, 
accessed September 1, 2007. 
 
 Finally, the Defense Missile System was another problem in Polish-Russian relations. 
Does public opinion in Russia and Poland differs on this issue? This can be checked by 
looking Tables 12 and 13, which show the opinions of Poles and Russian on the same topic. 
The poll was taken around the same time in 2007, when the discussion about the Defense 
Missile System started becoming an important issue. Also, it is worth noticing that the 
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system is still in the phase of negotiating, therefore there are no final decisions made. The 
future is to clarify whether defense shields will actually be place on the Polish territory, and 
the topic is expected to remain in the center of foreign policy discussions for Poland, Russia 
and even United States to certain degree.  
 
Table 12. Poles’ stand on Defense Missile System 
 
What is your opinion on the Defense 
Missile System 
February 2007 
Definitely for 9% 
Probably for 19% 
Hard to say 17% 
Probably against 25% 
Definitely against 30% 
Total 100% 
Source: CBOS, February 2007: “Polacy o tarczy antyrakietowej”, 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2007/K_112_07.PDF, accessed September 11, 2007. 
 
Interestingly, in both Russia and Poland more people have negative feelings about placing 
the Defense System in Poland and Czech Republic rather that supporting the idea. More than 
a half of Poles are against the system (55%), and only 28% declared support of it. Russian 
are even more skeptic and 74% of Russian respondents had negative feelings about the 
defense system. Only 2% claimed positive feelings. It seems that Russians and Poles, the 
people, do not differ much, when involvement of the United States comes to play into 
regional geopolitics. 
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Table 13. Russians on Defense Missile System 
 
Do you have positive, negative or 
indifferent feelings about U.S. plans to set 
up missile defense system in Eastern 
Europe?  
May 3, 2007 
Positive  2% 
Negative  74% 
Indifferent  15% 
Hard to answer 9% 
Total  100% 
Source: FOM, May 3, 2007: “U.S. Plans to Set Up a Missile Defense System in Eastern 
Europe”, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edomt0718_3/ed071821, 
accessed September 11, 2007. 
 
Public opinion showed that both sides think that Polish-Relations are worse than they 
used to be. Perception in both countries is less positive than perception of people themselves. 
Russians and Poles differed in sensitivity to the question of Ukraine, as their governments 
also took a stands on different sides (Poland supported Yushchenko and Russia supported 
Yanukovich).  Poles thought that embargo on Polish meat was highly political, while, those 
of Russians who were aware of the topic were convinced that Polish veto on EU-Russia 
negotiations was an outcome of that embargo. Finally a majority of both publics think 
negatively of placing the defense missile system in Poland and Czech Republic.  
The most interesting thing that comes out of those polls is that Poles and Russians seem to 
like each other in general, but the problem starts when asking for government approval; 
However, it may be judged that since there is not many sources for animosity on societal 
levels, there should be a room for improvement of the Russian-Polish official relations.  
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CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The relationship between Russia and Poland has been very difficult and very 
problematic since the beginnings of these states’ existence. History showed years of conflicts 
and mutual distrust and as a result of this, modern healthy, partner-to-partner relationship 
seems extremely hard to achieve. Maria Czekaleva-Demidovskaya wrote: “As a consequence 
of the lack of clear strategy Poland’s attitude toward Russia is determined by unfounded fears 
and history-based beliefs very often being in conflict with other interest of the country, for 
example in economic sphere” (6). Whether those fears were really unfounded remains a topic 
for discussion, but this does not change the fact that the legacy of common history is visible.  
Poland may lack clear strategy toward Russia. But as many of the young 
democracies, a solid, stable and effective institutions resulting in positive outcomes of 
various policies are threatened by constantly changing governments, for instance. Moreover, 
Poland has chosen to involve itself with the European Union and United States as a primary 
focus in foreign policy. Czekaleva-Demidovskaya, in the same paper said:  
 
“Russia, tries to ignore new factors, pretending that nothing has 
changed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It means 
that Russia is focused on the past concerning its relations with 
Central and Eastern European countries and, consequently, 
cannot produce and follow a strategy applicable for the future” 
(8). 
 
Perhaps Russia is pretending that nothing has changed since the collapse of the USSR is the 
reason why there is no improvement of mutual relations as well as clear and modern strategy 
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towards each other. Perhaps the fact that Russia seems unable to adjust to the reality in which 
it does not have an authority to control actions of the former satellite states puts a significant 
halt on the possibility of creating relationship that would be successful. History left a 
significant mark on both countries and the legacy is very troublesome for modern and future 
generations.  
 The successes of modern Polish-Russian relations are very limited, leaving both 
countries independent after the collapse of communism is one of the positive outcomes. 
Poland also considers Russian “concession” about NATO as different a kind of success. The 
failures are definitely more numerous and usually in the center of attention. The biggest one, 
causing many other failures to happen, is lack of conciliation and firm approach of both 
countries toward each other. Lack of trust and fresh start in making new foreign policy are 
another. 
 
    Future of the relationship  
 
 The future of mutual relations relies on many factors. The main one is reconciliation 
and trust that should be built as a base for future cooperation. Nobody expects the two 
countries to become the best partners on the international stage, but objective and firm policy 
based on respect could be achieved. In creating policies and decisions, it seems that historical 
background still plays a significant role, limiting objective approach at the same time. Public 
opinion shows that average people do not have aversion toward each other. Based on that 
there should be definitely a mutual campaign creating new image of both countries. Poland 
should also assure Russia, that the fact that Poland joined the European Union, NATO does 
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not interfere with creating successful eastern foreign policy. Poland as a new member of the 
EU should also lead the union in making good policies with the east, but so far it is the only 
country that vetoes the negotiations with Russia.  
 There also should be room for bilateral relationship, which ought not to be forgotten. 
Poland is a part of the EU, but it also a neighbor of Russia, and this fact should finally 
become an advantage rather than a curse. The geopolitics of Poland may become a benefit 
rather than fear factor. Legacy of the past is seen in modern relations of Poland and Russia. 
History was brutal and violent; both nations have every right to claim their losses. However, 
every day is a good day to start a new history that will overshadow the past that is so 
unfortunate. It will not be easy, and it will not take months. However, it is possible, and both 
sides should start with the belief that there is a chance for better relationship in the future.  
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